Atheist presuppositions

[jms]

I am very solidly reformed etc., but over the course of my education and many conversations with atheists, I have built up an atheist critic that sits in the back of my head and that I regularly do battle with. I have been reading presuppositional apologetics material recently, and I have either not grasped the full force of the arguments I have read, or my critic has been able to answer them. I find myself drawn towards Clark's view of presuppositions as axioms, but have felt that the main reason my critic is told that he can't be rational is because he has not been granted any axioms. One cannot prove an axiom, but a set of them can be disproved if they are internally inconsistent. I take Clark's position to be that any non-Christian axioms are inconsistent, so I put forth my atheist critic's set of axioms for discussion:

1. There exist patterns that connect the past to the future (e.g. physical laws, tendencies in human psychology, etc)
2. Humans are capable of discovering at least some of those patterns. Note that this makes no claim about external truth, only observed correlations.
3. Knowledge of these patterns is the only kind of knowledge that humans can hope to attain to. Any other type of knowledge is unattainable, and quite possibly meaningless.

First off, I realize that no amount of knowledge about how things are can provide clues about how things ought to be, so axiom 3 immediately excludes knowledge of ethics. My critic is comfortable with saying there is no universal right or wrong, and everyone just pursues whatever goals biology has randomly handed them. His morals are no "better" than those of a serial killer because there is no universal definition of "better", and he's ok with that.

The problem I'm having is that Van Til, Clark, Bahnson, etc. all argue that without presupposing that the scripture is the word of God, man can't know anything. And yet, my atheist critic claims that based on his axioms he can perform science and gain knowledge of the world. The problem of the one and the many is solved because knowledge is not about objects per se, but about patterns between the past and the future. Even if the world consisted only of a sequence of completely abstract symbols (particulars), there would still be knowledge to be gained under this definition. So what do you think? Do his presuppositions save rationality for him or not?

[Objectivitees]

How does your 'critic' know there are patterns, he can know some of them, and that this is the only kind of knowledge that it attainable, without first presupposing that the logic he uses to gain this knowledge is valid methodology to do so? Once the assumption is made, can he find within his own Atheistic worldview justification for the existence of said logic? In other words, does he have reason to believe he can reason, outside the assumption he can reason? If not, then his worldview is internally inconsistent and can be said to be irrational.

The Christian finds the justification for the same use of logic in scripture after the assumption is made it is valid, thus providing affirmation, not proof. The atheist is without this affirmation. He therefore has an arbitrarily held belief, and is not saved from irrationality.

In short, I don't think the order (van til, Bahnsen and Clark) point to, that scripture has to be assumed first is relevant, the apologetic can proceed from the common ground between the two points of view, the assumption logic exists and is valid for gaining knowledge. What's important here is- "is the internal consistency affirmed from within the confines of the particular worldview?" Christianity, yes, Atheism, no.

[jms]

It seems to me that no axiom or presupposition can be argued for, except on the basis of other axioms. So to ask for a proof of these three axioms is like asking for a proof that the Bible is the ultimate source of authority. On what basis could we hope to prove such a thing without begging the question? In the Christian worldview, this is and must be taken on faith, and to be fair, the atheist must be allowed some axioms based on faith as well. It seems an invalid critique of a worldview to ask for proof of axioms. My critic is not scared of basing a worldview on faith; it is completely unavoidable.

As to the validity of logic, it is seen just as one of those discovered patterns. Having observed lots of statements about the world, my critic has never observed an unambiguous statement which is both true and false at the same time. Or, perhaps couched better in the language of his axioms, he has never observed an unambiguous statement which was true and suddenly becomes false without anything it references changing. The law of excluded middle, or any of the rest of logic, is nothing but a set of patterns the world happens to follow. My critic makes no statements, indeed never could expect to have an explanation, for why any of the axioms are true. However, they seem to be internally consistent and give him a basis for knowledge.

[shotgun]

Mr. JMS,

Thanks for asking these questions. You are not alone in misunderstanding aspects of Van Til's theology.

I recommend the book by Dr. Bahnsen, recently published by American Vision. Bahnsen devotes a chapter to Gordon Clark.

With that out of the way...allow me to critique your Atheist friend's set of "axioms."

Your atheist friend's view of axioms is short-sighted. Don't let him forget that you found him in a chatroom somewhere, blaspheming God and saying all sorts of crazy things about the age of the Earth, and the nature of reality (I realize he's only in your head, but still...) Should we allow him to arbitrarily say: "My foundational axiom is everything Dawkins says in "The Selfish Gene"?" This is far too broad of a statement to be axiomatic. So are the three "axioms" your atheist friend listed.

For axiom 1 to be the case, your mental atheist must accept some notion of time and motion. For this, he must posit some sort of metaphysical view. That's the rub...we disagree about the fundamental nature of reality. (This is why Van Til begins his writings with a strong discussion of theology. Frame admits as much in his article on Aseity.) So axiom 1 is not really axiomatic after all. To grant this to the Atheist is a mistake. You may as well grant to him that your position is false, and then try to prove your position true within the matrix of that axiom.

Axiom 2 requires a belief in the legitimacy of sense experiences, and so axiom 2 is not properly basic either, and shouldn't be granted. (Just because someone wants to arbitrarily claim something as an "axiom" doesn't mean they are justified in doing so.) In order for the atheist to justify his sense experiences, he will again have to allude to some metaphysical view. What is reality and why does it allow for sense experiences?

Axiom 3 is self refuting. Is axiom 3 known? If not, then it isn't an axiom. If so, then you have knowledge about something external to the patterns and you refute yourself. This statement would have to be one of the "patterns" experienced. But this statement is about patterns, and not the content of the patterns, and therefore, if the statement were true, we wouldn't be able to KNOW it were true. Not only is it self refuting, even if it were NOT self refuting, the only way your atheist friend would know it were true, is if...again, he had a notion about the nature of reality. He'd have to be omniscient and omnipresent. Just like with the other two axioms...he is forgetting to discuss the real disagreement, which is one concerning the nature of reality.

I'd love to continue this discussion...but, I'm out of space.

[Objectivitees]

However, they seem to be internally consistent and give him a basis for knowledge.

But he would never have a basis to claim that 'knowledge' were real, unless he can find affirmation (consistency) both inside and outside his own worldview. Your critic (being Atheist) can't do that.

he is forgetting to discuss the real disagreement, which is one concerning the nature of reality.

Which seems another way to say whut I were sayin'.

[shotgun]

Hey Mr. O.Tees...

I liked your reply...I just couldn't resist adding my own two cents. Sorry for not mentioning you or interacting with your statements in my previous reply...I had a lot to say in a small space.

[Objectivitees]

Hey Mr. O.Tees...

I liked your reply...I just couldn't resist adding my own two cents. Sorry for not mentioning you or interacting with your statements in my previous reply...I had a lot to say in a small space.

Not a problem, thanks for the "affirmation" heheh.

[jms]

Let's take axiom 3 first. What do you mean by known? Do you mean proved? As stated before, you can't prove an axiom; it must be taken on faith. The axioms do not fall under the heading of knowledge because they are assumptions. For some reason people seem to be unable to remember that the axioms of their worldview are simply assumptions, so they hold on to them with a vicious tenacity. In the case of non-Christian axioms, this is due in large part to sin, but it would be understandable anyway because switching worldviews is ridiculously hard. Still, they are not "known".

Now for axioms 1 and 2. First off, I'm a bit confused by your comment on axiom 1 being too broad, like claiming everything in Dawkin's book as an axiom. It sounds very reminiscent of our claim that everything the Bible says is our axiom. Why can we get away with this, but the atheist can't? I would think the refutation of this would not be that it's too broad, but that Dawkin's book is inconsistent with itself. Although, I might note that claiming the Bible as an axiom does strike me as counter to Occam's razor (i.e. too broad).

As to axiom 1 requiring a notion of time and motion, the beauty of axiom 1 is that it is stated in terms of inputs to the brain, not in terms of external reality. Yes, these inputs come in an order, so perhaps it can be said to assume something about time, but I don't think it does assume anything about space or external reality. The notions of 3 dimensional space, objects, laws, and so forth can be viewed as simply ways of explaining correlations between the past inputs and future input (my doctoral work was in artificial intelligence, and was very concerned with this idea).

Axiom 2 is not about the legitimacy of sense experience so much as about our ability to recognize the patterns before us. Without axiom 2, it may be that we are unable to recognize the patterns we observe, but are so dumb we think we are actually recognizing something when we're not. Axiom 2 says basically that our brains are working.

Incidentally, even if axiom 1 did require a notion of time and motion, would this be so bad? When it comes to axioms and theorems, they are often hard to distinguish. If statement A is true if and only if statement B is true, then either could be considered the axiom and the other the theorem. In the same way, anything axiom 1 requires is entailed by axiom 1. So it seems like you are arguing that it isn't a valid axiom because it entails something...

[Objectivitees]

That's the rub...we disagree about the fundamental nature of reality.

Ithink what shotgun is pointing out here, is that the Atheists’ (critic in yer mind) worldview says “there is no metaphysic” yet then turns around and uses the metaphysical construct of logic. He displays an inconsistency with his own presupposition.

The other two ‘Axioms’, being derived from the same inconsistent use of logic suffer from the same flaw, only expressed differently.

Anyway… that’s the extent of my two cents. I apologize if that’s not where you were going SG.

JMS…do you think it’s possible the critic in my mind is that same one in yours?

[shotgun]

JMS, consider this citation from Immanuel Kant:

"[Hume] demonstrated irrefutably that it was entirely impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination as involves necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori." - preface to Kant's "Philosophy of Material Nature" page 3 in Ellington's translation.

I'm not polite enough to simply grant the God-hater the ability to provide coherency among particulars, especially when Kant, Hume, and other great men after them (ask me for citations) confess that it's impossible.

So...of course the philosophically untrained atheist in a chatroom or college classroom is going to demand you simply grant it to him. He cannot provide for coherency otherwise, nor (most likely) is he familiar with the history of thought concerning the issue.

You need to have your atheist friend demonstrate why Axiom 3 is not self refuting (as I pointed out)* and why axiom 1 and 2 are properly basic. If David Hume and Kant wouldn't consider those axioms as legitimately basic, then why should we as Christians? Additionally, if your atheist friend doesn't care about the nature of reality, then you can bid him farewell and God speed...he has effectively removed himself from the debate. (Makes our job as an apologist easier, though less fun.)

* Your foundational axiom is assumed "known" or "given" in order for the system to work. So, in this case, if it cannot be rationally assumed as "given" then it is no longer an axiom.

**Update**

O.Tees...YES! Well said. Additionally...I'm fond of Russel Manion's paper: "Metaphysics and Meaning" in which a consistent naturalist (a nihilist) convinces an inconsistent naturalist that his naturalism leads to complete irrationality. The inconsistent naturalist tries appealing to arbitrary axiomatic systems. As if he could change systems like he changes hats. The consistent naturalist points out that this makes his entire system "unrational" in that it's ultimately arbitrary and thus trivial...able to describe anything, leaving reality just as mysterious as ever.

[jms]

"But he would never have a basis to claim that 'knowledge' were real, unless he can find affirmation (consistency) both inside and outside his own worldview. Your critic (being Atheist) can't do that." - Objectivitees

Huh? If you could explain that a bit more fully, I'd appreciate it.

Shotgun, you mentioned Manion's paper, and it sounds very interesting. Do you know where I can get a copy of it?

As to the quotation from Kant, my philosophical background is a bit weak (as you may have noticed), and even though I read it several times, I'm not sure what Kant is saying. I'm assuming that the problem he's mentioning is the one and the many. I understand the problem of the one and the many as it is framed, but it seems to me that the problem is not insoluble. The one and the many assumes that knowledge is either found in splitting something down into its particulars or generalizing classes together into classes, and either approach fails.

An alternate approach, which I haven't seen in the philosophy stuff I've read but that hardly means it's not there somewhere, is an idea that has been in the artificial intelligence literature for 20 years under the heading of "predictive coding". The idea of predictive coding is that the purpose of the brain is to take intelligent action, and this always happens in the present. However, the brain only has information from the past. The immediate consequence of this is that the only information from the past that is useful is information which has bearing on the future. Since reprocessing the entire past at every point in time is a difficult proposal, the main task of perception is to squeeze out of the observed past the information that still has bearing on the future. By this framework, knowledge consists of a) knowing how to recognize information from the stream of events which may have bearing on the future, and b) remembering the information you have already squeezed out of the past.

As I mentioned before, even if the input symbols are completely abstract, there is still meaning in the sequence under this definition. As a simple example of this, I once ran a program on the first 7 chapters of Genesis that just examined statistics of pairs of letters, and it classified letters into vowels and consonants. Its reason was simply that whether the currently observed letter is a vowel or a consonant gives information about what the next letter is likely to be. Note that this information is not contained in the letters themselves; they were considered as perfectly abstract particulars with no properties at all. Nonetheless, knowledge existed, and the program could find some of it. So the problem of the one and the many, which seems to me to be at the heart of rejecting the possibility of atheist knowledge, seems to me to have a solution after all. Do you know if this solution has been considered in philosophy before? If so. why did they reject it?

[Objectivitees]

Huh? If you could explain that a bit more fully, I'd appreciate it.

Basically, I was trying to say (as was shotgun) that a claim to knowledge can't be considered as rational or 'truth' unless it has a correspondence to reality. A belief held even when based on the kind of logic you described is arbitrary if it is not affirmed or justified by another source. Logic is assumed by the Atheist to be a means to knowledge but if Logic is not affirmed by the Atheist worldview independent of the assumption, it stands unsupported, as does any other "knowledge" derived from it's use. Unsupported (by reason) beliefs are arbitrary. Arbitrary beliefs are irrational. The Atheist cannot justify the existence of the logic he uses. The Christian makes the same assumption, but then finds Logic affirmed and justified within the purview of the Christian worldview. Therefore when the Christian uses logic to derive 'knowledge' about 'reality, it is not arbitrary, and therefore not irrational. The Atheist can derive knowledge, but he can't claim it is rational.

Do his presuppositions save rationality for him or not?

Was not the concluding question in your original post concerned with whether the Logic you described "saved" your "critic" from irrationality? I vote "not".